User-Guided Verification of Security Protocols via Sound Animation

SEFM 2024

Kangfeng Ye, Roberto Metere, Poonam Yadav

November 7th, 2024







Outline

Background and motivations

ITree-based CSP

Modelling of Protocols

Evaluation

Conclusion and future work

Formal verification of security protocols

Successful applications

Background and motivations

00000

Authentication (5G AKA [BDH+18]), Handover (5G), Privacy, Access control, TLS (HTTPS), Payment (EMV^1) , and many more . . .

¹Basin et al. Tamarin: Verification of Large-Scale, Real World, Cryptographic Protocols, IEEE Security and Privacy Magazine (2022)

Benefits

•റററ്റ

Background and motivations

- Discovery of unknown vulnerabilities: Needham-Schroeder PKP [Low95], 5G AKA
- ▶ Identification of missing or weak assumptions: 5G AKA and handover
- Proposal of fixes or improvements to protocols: NSPK and 5G AKA
- Guarantee of correctness (EMV)

Notations and tools

Background and motivations


00000

- Process algebras: CSP (FDR) and Applied Pi Calculus (ProVerif)
- Inductive sets: Isabelle
- State-based: TLA+-based AVISPA
- LTS and (multi-sets) rewriting rules: Maude-NPA, Tamarin-prover
- Model checking and theorem proving

Current practice and problems


Background and motivations

00000



Background and motivations

റെറ്റ



Problems:

- Not accessible to designers
- Non-iterative, or slow-iteration

Accessible formal verification to engineers

Animation of a formal specification

Background and motivations

- ▶ an executable computer program implemented in C/C++, Java, or Haskel etc.
- ► UI to interact with models for users
- ► Kazmierczak et al. [KWD98]: an animator for Z specifications
- ▶ Dutle et al. [DMNB15]: manually translate formally verified models to Java code
- ▶ Miller et al. [MBWN22]: an emulator (C++) to experiment with 5G AKE
- Boichut et al.'s SPAN [BGGH07]: an animation tool (OCaml and Tcl/Tk) for HLPSL, used in AVISPA.

Problems: soundness is not guaranteed (implementations may have bugs), need efforts to develop code

Background and motivations

ဝဝဝဝီဝ


Background and motivations

ററാര്റ

Novel contributions

An interactive workflow supports

- automatically generated sound animators (Haskell),
- a lightweight and verified model checker: manual, automatic (exhaustive and random) exploration, reachability and feasibility checking
- ▶ a user-guided verification: automatic verification after manual exploration
- accessible to designers and fast iteration
- two case studies: Needham-Schroeder public key protocol (NSPK) and Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (DH)



Background and motivations

ဝဝဝဝိ

Coinductive trees, with potentially infinite breadth and depth, used to represent the ways a process communicates with its environment and evolves over time.

Executable denotational semantics², originally mechanised in Coq

Mechanisation in Isabelle/HOL³

```
codatatype ('e, 'r) itree =
  Ret 'r l
  Sil "('e, 'r) itree" |
  Vis "'e \rightarrow ('e, 'r) itree"
```

```
- < Terminate, returning a value >
```

- < Visible events and continuations >

^{- &}lt; Invisible event >

¹Xia et al. 2019. Interaction trees: representing recursive and impure programs in Coq. Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 4, POPL

²Xia, L.v.: Executable Denotational Semantics with Interaction Trees. PhD thesis, 2022

³Foster et al. Formally verified simulations of state-rich processes using interaction trees in Isabelle/HOL. CONCUR (2021)

ITree-based Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP)¹²

- Deterministic processes
- **Stateful** processes: P : Q
- No nondeterministic operator
- Biased external choice and parallel composition (priority)
- Hide with priority
- Renaming with priority

¹Foster et al. Formally verified simulations of state-rich processes using interaction trees in Isabelle/HOL. CONCUR (2021)

²Ye et al. Formally verified animation for RoboChart using interaction trees. JLAMP (2024)

Soundness: unbroken link from ITree-based CSP to Haskell

```
Isabelle/HOL
                                                                                                        Hackell
 definition outp where
                                                                Security
                                                                                               RoboChart
                                                                                                                  Security
                                             RoboChart
                                                                                                                                outn c v =
 "outp c v =
                                                                                                                                  Interaction Trees.Vis
  Vis
                                                                                                                                     (Interaction Trees Pfun of alist
     (pfun of alist
                                                                                                                                      [(Prisms.prism build c v.
                                                                                                      ITree-based CSP
       [(build oce v, Ret())])"
                                                   ITree-based CSP
                                                                                                                                         Interaction Trees.Ret ())]):
                                                                                                                                    data Itree a h =
codatatype ('e, 'r) itree =
                                                                                                                                      Ret b
                                                                                                                   ITrees
                                           Z math libraries
                                                                ITrees
                                                                                             Z math libraries
  Ret 'r I
                                                                                                                                      Sil (Itree a b)
  Sil "('e, 'r) itree" ("\tau") |
                                                                                                                                     Vis (Pfun a (Itree a b)):
 Vis "'e → ('e, 'r) itree"
                                                                                                                  data Pfun a b =
                                                                                                                    Pfun of alist [(a, b)]
   lift definition pfun of alist ::
                                                                           Code generation
                                                                                                                    Pfun of map (a -> Maybe b)
     "('a \times 'b) list \Rightarrow 'a \rightarrow 'b" is map of .
                                                                                                                    Pfun entries (Set.Set a) (a -> b);
                                                                           Equational logic
                                                                           Data Refinement
                                                                         Algorithm Refinement
                                                     lemma dom pfun alist [simp, code]:
                                                        "pdom (pfun of alist xs) = set (map fst xs)"
                                                        by (transfer, simp add: dom map of conv image fst)
```

¹Haftmann F., Nipkow, T.: Code Generation via Higher-Order Rewrite Systems, FLOPS (2010)


Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol (NSPK)

1978, Roger Needham and Michael Schroeder¹

Establish secure communication between two parties over an insecure network

¹ Roger M. Needham and Michael D. Schroeder. 1978. Using encryption for authentication in large networks of computers. Commun. ACM 21, 12 (Dec. 1978)


- 1. $A \rightarrow S : (A, B)$
- 2. $S \to A : \{ (pk(B), B) \}_{sk(S)}^s$
- 3. $A \to B : \{(na, A)\}_{pk(B)}$
- 4. $B \to S : (B, A)$
- 5. $S \to B : \{ (pk(A), A) \}_{sk(S)}^s$
- 6. $B \to A : \{ (na, nb) \}_{pk(A)}$
- 7. $A \to B : \{ nb \}_{pk(B)}$



Messages 1,2,4,5 to retrieve public keys and Messages 3, 6, 7 for authentication

NSPK three-message version

- **1.** $A \to S : (A, B)$
- **2.** $S \to A : \{ (pk(B), B) \}_{sk(S)}^s$
- 3. $A \rightarrow B : \{(na, A)\}_{pk(B)}$: assume both A and B knows each other's public key
- **4.** $B \to S : (B, A)$
- 5. $S \to B : \{(pk(A), A)\}_{sk(S)}^s$
- 6. $B \to A : \{(na, nb)\}_{pk(A)}$
- 7. $A \to B : \{ nb \}_{pk(B)}$




NSPK three-message version

The man-in-the-middle-attack¹: assume public keys are known to all principals

- 1. $A \to I : \{(na, A)\}_{nk(I)}$
- 2. $I(A) \rightarrow B : \{\{(na,A)\}\}_{pk(B)}: I \text{ pretends to be } A$
- 3. $B \to I(A) : \{(na, nb)\}_{nk(A)}$
- 4. $I \to A : \{(na, nb)\}_{nk(A)}$
- 5. $A \to I : \{ \{nb\} \}_{nk(I)}$
- 6. $I(A) \to B: \{ |hb| \}_{hk(B)}$: B believes that A has correctly established a session (shared secret (na, nb)) with him, but actually not

¹Lowe, G. (1995). An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. In IPL.

The man-in-the-middle-attack¹: assume public keys are known to all principals



¹Lowe, G. (1995). An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. In IPL.

Security Properties

Secrecy or confidentiality

The attacker cannot derive na and nb


Authenticity


Authentication for the initiator A:

- A commits to a session with B only if B took part in the protocol run
- Authentication for the responder B:
- ▶ B commits to a session with A only if A took part in the protocol run

Modelling of Protocols







The attacker controls the entire network and can

intercept, delete, modify, delay, inject, and build new messages.

but limited by the cryptography and cannot

decrypt messages without knowing the key. perfect blackbox cryptography

¹D. Dolev and A. Yao, "On the security of public key protocols," in IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 198-208, March 1983

Intruder message inference rules

 $K \vdash_{\Downarrow} m$ - what the intruder can learn from a set of known messages K; Passive attacker $K \vdash_{\Uparrow} m$ - what the intruder can build/fake from a set of known messages K

$$\left\{ m \mid \left(K \vdash_{\Downarrow} m \right) \right\} \vdash_{\Uparrow} m$$
: Active attacker

Name	Premise	Break down	Build up
Member	$m \in K$	$K \vdash_{\downarrow \downarrow} m$	$K \vdash_{\pitchfork} m$
Pairing	$m \in K \land m' \in K$	*	$K \vdash_{\pitchfork}^{"}(m,m')$
Unpairing	$(m,m')\in K$	$K dash_{\Downarrow} m$ and $K dash_{\Downarrow} m$	
Encryption/Sign	$m \in K \land k \in K$	·	$K \vdash_{\Uparrow} \{m\}_k$
Decryption/Verify	$\{m\}_k \in K \wedge k^{-1} \in K$	$K \vdash_{\Downarrow} m$	

```
datatype dagent = Alice | Bob | Intruder
datatype dnonce = N dagent
datatype dpkey = PK dagent
datatype dskey = SK dagent
datatype dkey = Kp dpkey | Ks dskey
datatype dmsg = MAg (ma:dagent) | MNon (mn:dnonce) | MKp (mkp:dpkey) |
    MKs (mks:dskey) | MCmp (mc1:dmsg) (mc2:dmsg) |
    MEnc (mem:dmsg) (mek:dpkey)
```

Used to specify and verify properties

```
datatype dsig = StartProt dagent dagent dnonce dnonce
```

- | EndProt dagent dagent dnonce dnonce
- | ClaimSecret (sag:dagent) (sn:dnonce) (sp: " \mathbb{P} dagent")

Modelling of NSPK3 - type definitions

Channels for communication between processes

```
datatype Chan =
  env :: dagent×dagent
  send, recv, hear, fake :: dagent×dagent×dmsg
  leak :: dmsg
  sig :: dsig
  terminate :: unit
```

Protocol

- 1. $A \to B : \{(na, A)\}_{pk(B)}$
- 2. $B \to A$: $\{(na, nb)\}_{pk(A)}$
- 3. $A \to B : \{ nb \}_{pk(B)}$

```
PAlice(A, na) \cong
         env!A?B \rightarrow
         sig!ClaimSecrect!A!na!\{B\} \rightarrow
         send!\langle na,A\rangle_{pk(B)} \rightarrow
         recv?m: \{\langle na, nb \rangle_{nk(A)}\} \rightarrow
         sig!StartProt!A!B!na!nb \rightarrow
         send!nb_{nk(B)} \rightarrow
         sig!EndProt!A!B!na!nb \rightarrow
         terminate
```

Modelling of NSPK3

Protocol

- 1. $A \to B : \{(na, A)\}_{pk(B)}$
- 2. $B \to A$: $\{(na, nb)\}_{pk(A)}$
- 3. $A \to B : \{ nb \}_{pk(B)}$

```
PBob(B, nb) \cong
        recv?m: \{\langle na, A \rangle_{nk(B)}, \dots \} \rightarrow
        sig!ClaimSecrect!B!nb!\{A\} \rightarrow
        sia!StartProt!B!A!na!nb \rightarrow
        send!\langle na, nb\rangle_{pk(A)} \rightarrow
        recv?m: \{nb_{nk(B)}\} \rightarrow
        sig!EndProt!B!A!na!nb \rightarrow
        terminate
```

Modelling of NSPK3

Protocol

- 1. $A \to B : \{(na, A)\}_{pk(B)}$
- 2. $B \to A$: $\{(na, nb)\}_{pk(A)}$
- 3. $A \to B : \{ nb \}_{pk(B)}$

 $PIntruder(I, ni, kn, ss) \stackrel{\frown}{=}$

 $hear?m \rightarrow PIntruder(I, ni, breakm(kn \cup \{m\}), ss)$

- $\Box \ (\Box \ m : build_n(kn) \bullet fake!m \to PIntruder(I, ni, kn, ss))$
- $\square \ (\square \ s : ss \cap kn \bullet \textcolor{red}{leak!} s \rightarrow PIntruder(I, ni, kn, ss))$
- \Box terminate \rightarrow Skip

Modelling of NSPK3

NSPK3 protocol

Protocol


- 1. $A \to B : \{(na, A)\}_{pk(B)}$
- 2. $B \rightarrow A$: $\{(na, nb)\}_{pk(A)}$
- 3. $A \to B : \{ nb \}_{pk(B)}$

```
initknows \ \widehat{=} \ Agents \cup PublicKeys \cup \{ni, sk_I\}
secrets \ \widehat{=} \ \{na, nb\}
NSPK3 \ \widehat{=}
\left(PAlice(Alice, na) \parallel_{\{terminte\}} PBob(Bob, nb)\right)
\parallel_{\{send, recv, terminate\}}
PIntruder(I, ni, initknows, secrets)
```

 $[hear \leftarrow send, fake \leftarrow recv]$

Demonstration

Automatic code generation from Isabelle/HOL



Demonstration

Manual exploration

```
Starting ITree Animation...
Events:
 (1) Env [Alice] Bob:
 (2) Env [Alice] Intruder:
 (3) Recy [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>} PK Bob:
 (4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Intruder>} PK Bob;
[Choose: 1-4]: 1
Env C (Alice, Bob)
Events:
(1) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Alice>} PK Bob:
 (2) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Intruder>} PK Bob;
 (3) Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [ Bob ]);
[Choose: 1-3]: 3
Sig C (ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Bob]))
Events:
(1) Send [Alice=>Intruder] {<N Alice. Alice>} PK Bob:
 (2) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>} PK Bob;
 (3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Intruder>} PK Bob:
[Choose: 1-3]: 1
Send C (Alice.(Intruder.MEnc (MCmp (MNon (N Alice)) (MAg Alice)) (PK Bob)))
Events:
(1) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Alice. Alice>} PK Bob;
 (2) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>}_PK Bob;
 (3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Intruder>} PK Bob:
```

Starting ITree Animation...

Demonstration

Automatic modes

```
Events:
 (1) Env [Alice] Bob;
 (2) Env [Alice] Intruder:
 (3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>} PK Bob;
 (4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Intruder>} PK Bob;
[Choose: 1-4]: h
*** Usage ***
Auto n: Exhaustive search of traces up to n events or length;
Rand n: Random search of a trace up to n events or length:
AReach n %er1:er2:...%[#%em1:em2:...%] : Exhaustive search of traces up to
```

RReach n %er1;er2;...%[#%em1;em2;...%] : Random search of a trace up to n Feasible %event1; event2; ... %: Check whether the specified sequence of eve

Demonstration

Starting ITree Animation... Events: (1) Env [Alice] Bob: (2) Env [Alice] Intruder: (3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Alice>} PK Bob: (4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Intruder>} PK Bob: [Choose: 1-4]: AReach 15 %Terminate% AReach 15. %Terminate% Reachability by Auto: 15 Events for reachability check: ["Terminate"] Events for monitor: []*** These events ["Terminate"] are reached! *** Trace: [Env [Alice] Bob. Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Bob]). Send [Alice=>Into rot Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob). Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice. Recv rot Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob), Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {N Bob} PK Bob, Sig EndProt Bob Al: *** These events ["Terminate"] are reached! *** Trace: [Env [Alice] Bob. Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Bob]). Send [Alice=>Into rot Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob). Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice. Recv

Termination

*** These events ["Terminate"] are reached! ***

Trace: [Env [Alice] Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Bob]), Send [Alice=>Into rot Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob). Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice. Recv b<=Intruderl {N Bob} PK Bob. Sig EndProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob). Sig EndProt Bob Al

b<=Intruderl {N Bob} PK Bob. Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob). Sig EndProt Alice I

Demonstration

```
Starting ITree Animation...
Events:
(1) Env [Alice] Bob:
(2) Env [Alice] Intruder:
(3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>}_PK Bob;
 (4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Intruder>} PK Bob:
[Choose: 1-4]: AReach 15 %Leak N Bob%
AReach 15. %Leak N Bob%
Reachability by Auto: 15
 Events for reachability check: ["Leak N Bob"]
 Events for monitor: []
    .....*** These events ["Leak N Bob"] are reached! ***
Trace: [Env [Alice] Intruder, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [ Intruder ]), Send [A
lice=>Intruder] {<N Alice, Alice>}_PK Intruder, Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Alice, Alice>}_P
K Bob. Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [ Alice ]), Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N
Bob), Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice, N Bob>} PK Alice, Recv [Alice<=Intruder] {<N Alice.
N Bob>} PK Alice. Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob). Send [Alice=>Intruder]
{N Bob} PK Intruder. ]
.....*** Auto Reachability [15] Finished ***
```

Secrecy

Demonstration

User-guided verification

```
Starting ITree Animation...
Events:
 (1) Env [Alice] Bob:
 (2) Env [Alice] Intruder:
 (3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>} PK Bob;
 (4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder. Intruder>} PK Bob:
[Choose: 1-4]: 1
Env C (Alice, Bob)
Events:
(1) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>}_PK Bob;
(2) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Intruder>} PK Bob;
 (3) Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [ Bob ]):
[Choose: 1-3]: AReach 15 %Leak N Bob%
AReach 15. %Leak N Bob%
Reachability by Auto: 15
 Events for reachability check: ["Leak N Bob"]
 Events for monitor: []
  *** Auto Reachability [15] Finished ***
```

Demonstration

Authenticity for Alice

```
Starting ITree Animation...
Events:
(1) Env [Alice] Bob;
 (2) Env [Alice] Intruder;
 (3) Recy [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>} PK Bob:
 (4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Intruder>} PK Bob;
[Choose: 1-4]: AReach 15 %Sig EndProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)% # %Sig StartProt Bob A
lice (N Alice) (N Bob)%
AReach 15. %Sig EndProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)% # %Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice
) (N Bob)%
Reachability by Auto: 15
 Events for reachability check: ["Sig EndProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)"]
 Events for monitor: ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"]
......*** These events ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bo
b)"l are monitored! ***
*** These events ["Sig EndProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are reached! ***
Trace: [Env [Alice] Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [ Bob ]), Send [Alice=>Intr
uder] {<N Alice, Alice>} PK Bob, Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Alice, Alice>} PK Bob, Sig Clai
mSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [ Alice ]). Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob). Send [Bob
=>Intruder| {<N Alice, N Bob>} PK Alice, Recv [Alice<=Intruder] {<N Alice, N Bob>} PK Ali
ce, Sig StartProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob), Send [Alice=>Intruder] {N Bob} PK Bob, ]
```

......*** These events ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are monitored! *** ..*** These events ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are monitored! *** .*** These events ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are monitored! *** ..*** These events ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are monitored! ****** These events ["Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are monitored! *** These events ["Sig StartProt Rob Alice (N Alice) (N Rob)"] are monitored! ***

Evaluation

Demonstration

Authenticity for Bob Starting ITree Animation...

Events:

(1) Env [Alice] Bob;

(2) Env [Alice] Intruder;

(3) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>}_PK Bob;

(4) Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Intruder>}_PK Bob;

[Choose: 1-4]: AReach 15 %Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)% # %Sig StartProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)% AReach 15, %Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)% # %Sig StartProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)%

Reachability by Auto: 15

Events for reachability check: ["Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"]
Events for monitor: ["Sig StartProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)"]

*** These events ["Sig StartProt Alice Bob (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are monitored! ***

*** These events ["Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are reached! ***

Trace: [Env [Alice] Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Bob]), Send [Alices—Intruder] (4-Alice, Alices)—FK Bob, Recv [Bobe=Intruder] (4-Alice, Alices)—FK Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [Alice]), Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice, Alic

*** These events ["Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are reached! ***

Trace: [Env [Alice] Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) [Set [Bob]), Send [Alices—Intruder] (=N Alice, N Alice), M Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [Alice]), Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob), Send [Bob>=Intruder] (=N Alice, N Bob>), M Alice, N Bob>, M Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob), Send [Bob>=Intruder] (=N Alice, N Bob>), M Alice, Rev [Alices=Intruder] (=N Bob), M Alice, N Bob>), M Alice, N Bob>, M Alice, N Bob>, M Alice, N Bob>, M Alice) (N Bob), M Alice)

Trace: [Env [Alice] Intruder, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (M Alice) (Sef [Intruder], Send [Alice=Alice*A], Alice*A], PK Intruder, Recv [Bobb=Intruder] (-4 Alice, Alice*A), PK Intruder, Recv [Bobb=Intruder] (-4 Alice, Alice*A), PK Intruder, Recv [Alice*A], PK Intruder, Recv [Alice*A

*** These event ["Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are reached *** |
*** Trace: [Env Alice] Truder. Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Intruder **) |
*** Send [Alice=>Intruder] {<\nabla Alice.} PK Intruder. Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Intruder **) |
*** Trace: [Env Alice.] Truder. Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Intruder **) |
*** Trace: [Env Alice.] Truder. Sig ClaimSecret Alice.] PK Intruder. Sig ClaimSecret Alice.

[Bob⇔Intruder] {-dN Alice, Alice>} PK Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [Alice]), Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob), Send [Bob ⇒Intruder] (-dN Alice, N Bob>} PK Alice, Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob), Send [Alice⇒Intruder] (-dN Bob), PK Alice, Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob), PK Alice, Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob), PK Alice, Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Bob), PK Alice), Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Bob), PK Alice, Sig StartProt Alice Int

*** These events ["Sig EndProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)"] are reached! ***

Trace: [Env [Alice] Intruder, Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) [Set [Intruder], Send [Alices—Intruder] {≪N Alice, Alices}_PK Intruder, Recv [Bobb=Intruder] {≪N Alice, Alices}_PK Bob, Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob), Set [Alice], Sig StartPort Bob Alice (N Alice), Bob) Send Alice (N Alice), Sign StartPort Bob Alice (N Alice), Bob Send Alice, Alice, N Bob) → PK Alice, Sign Alice, Recv [Alice=Intruder] {≪N Alice, N Bob>} PK Alice, Sign Alice, Alice, N Bob> PK Alice, Sign Alice, Alice, N Bob> PK Alice, Sign Alice, Alice, N Bob) → PK Alice, N Bob) → PK Alice, N Bob PK Alice, N Bob) → PK Alice, N Bob) →

Automatic feasibility check

Starting ITree Animation... Events:

- (1) Env [Alicel Bob:
- (2) Env [Alice] Intruder:
- (3) Recy [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Alice>} PK Bob:
- (4) Recy [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Intruder, Intruder>} PK Bob:

[Choose: 1-4]: Feasible %Env [Alice] Intruder: Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Intruder]); Send [Alice=>Intruder] {<N Alice, Alice>} PK Intruder; Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Alice, Al ice>} PK Bob; Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [Alice]); Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob): Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice: Recv [Alice=Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice: Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob): Send [Alice=>Intruder] {N Bob} PK Intruder: Leak N Bob%

Feasible. %Env [Alice] Intruder: Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Alice) (Set [Intruder]): Send [Al ice=>Intruder] {<N Alice. Alice>} PK Intruder: Recv [Bob<=Intruder] {<N Alice. Alice>} PK Bob: Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [Alice]); Sig StartProt Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob); Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice: Recv [Alice<=Intruder] {<N Alice. N Bob>} PK Alice e: Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob): Send [Alice=>Intruder] {N Bob} PK Intruder: Leak N Bob%

Feasibility check the sequence of events: ["Env [Alice] Intruder". "Sig ClaimSecret Alice (N Al ice) (Set [Intruder])"."Send [Alice=>Intruder] {<N Alice. Alice>} PK Intruder"."Recv [Bob<=I ntruder | {<N Alice, Alice>} PK Bob". "Sig ClaimSecret Bob (N Bob) (Set [Alice])". "Sig StartPr ot Bob Alice (N Alice) (N Bob)", "Send [Bob=>Intruder] {<N Alice, N Bob>} PK Alice", "Recv [Alic e<=Intruder | {<N Alice, N Bob>} PK Alice". "Sig StartProt Alice Intruder (N Alice) (N Bob)". "Se nd [Alice=>Intruder] {N Bob} PK Intruder"."Leak N Bob"] *** The specified trace is feasible ****

Evaluation

NSPK3: secrecy and authenticity for Bob are violated

NSLPK3 - Lowe's corrected version¹: safe

- 1. $A \to B : \{(na, A)\}_{nk(B)}$
- 2. $B \to A : \{(na, nb, B)\}_{nk(A)}$
- 3. $A \to B : \{ \{nb\} \}_{nk(B)}$

DH: used the animation to find the similar man-in-the-middle-attack (several counterexamples)

DH with digital signature: not subject to the same attack

 $^{^{1}}$ Gavin Lowe. 1996. Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR. In (TACAs '96).


Conclusions

- ► Proposed an iterative workflow to support verification by designers through sound animation
- Enhanced animator to be a lightweight model checker: reachability and feasibility
- ▶ Verified two security protocols: NSPK and DH, and their corrected variants

Future work

- ► Generalisation of the framework for animation of security protocols
- Case studies
 - Physical layer security: watermarking and jamming, as security mechanism for IoT devices in edge-computing networks
 - 5G EAP-TLS, 5G AKA
 - Mesh Commissioning Protoco (MeshCoP) for the Thread network protocol
- Improvement of UI

Current not fully accessible → Fully automated workflow



Current limitations \rightarrow Theorem Proving: (ITree-based) CSP and Circus

Limitations

- Enumerable and finite data types: agents, nonces, etc. Finite number of sessions
- Intensive space and computation time requirements to infer messages for the intruder

Animation can only verify a protocol with finite agents and bounded message inference in a finite number of interactions or steps. These are due to the executable nature of animation.

Current limitations \rightarrow Theorem Proving: (ITree-based) CSP and Circus

Limitations

- Enumerable and finite data types: agents, nonces, etc. Finite number of sessions
- Intensive space and computation time requirements to infer messages for the intruder


Animation can only verify a protocol with finite agents and bounded message inference in a finite number of interactions or steps. These are due to the executable nature of animation.

However, these are not the limitations of ITrees and ITree-based CSP.

Combined sound animation with theorem proving

- ▶ ITree-based CSP or Circus: could be for deductive verification
- General CSP or Circus: with nondeterministic and refinement

Current limitations → Theorem Proving: (ITree-based) CSP and Circus



Thank you!



https://www-users.york.ac.uk/ky582/







Roberto Metere



Poonam Yaday



roberto.metere@york.ac.uk

poonam.yadav@york.ac.uk

DataMod24: Towards Achieving Energy Efficiency and Service Availability in O-RAN via Formal Verification



David Basin, Jannik Dreier, Lucca Hirschi, Saša Radomirovic, Ralf Sasse, and Vincent Stettler.

A Formal Analysis of 5G Authentication.

In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS '18, page 1383–1396, New York, NY, USA, 2018. Association for Computing Machinery.

- - Yohan Boichut, Thomas Genet, Yann Glouche, and Olivier Heen.
 Using animation to improve formal specifications of security protocols.
 In 2nd Conference on Security in Network Architectures and Information Systems (SARSSI 2007), pages 169–182, 2007.
- Aaron M. Dutle, César A. Muñoz, Anthony J. Narkawicz, and Ricky W. Butler. Software Validation via Model Animation, pages 92–108.

 Springer International Publishing, 2015.



Edmund Kazmierczak, Michael Winikoff, and Philip W. Dart.

Verifying Model Oriented Specifications through Animation.

In 5th Asia-Pacific Software Engineering Conference (APSEC '98). 2-4 December 1998. Taipei, Taiwan, ROC, pages 254–261, IEEE Computer Society, 1998.



Gavin Lowe.

An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol. Information Processing Letters, 56(3):131–133, November 1995.



Rhys Miller, Ioana Boureanu, Stephan Wesemeyer, and Christopher J. P. Newton. The 5G Key-Establishment Stack: In-Depth Formal Verification and Experimentation. In Proceedings of the 2022 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security, ASIA CCS '22, page 237-251, New York, NY, USA, 2022. Association for Computing Machinery.